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Special Police: A Benefit or a Threat?
I. INTRODUCTION
Private security is becoming big business as more companies consider it
necessary to supplement the protection provided by local law enforcement officials by
hiring special police to guard their property.I Although this additional protection, if
properly exercised, could benefit private employers by preventing or reducing
thievery and vandalism, the current law in the State of Ohio leaves the expanding
field of private security open to abuse by these employers and their security
personnel. The statutory authority for special police is unclear, and the courts' task
is complicated by various categories of special police. 2
Private security functions are currently performed by private police, special
deputy sheriffs, and noncommissioned private security guards. Special police
generally are not considered to be peace officers3 nor do they receive the extensive
training statutorily mandated for peace officers. 4 The legislature and the courts have
not delineated clearly the bounds of authority of special police; therefore none of
these entities, least of all the special police, understands the scope of their authority.
Until these boundaries are clearly established, private individuals risk having their
constitutional rights violated or having various torts, such as false imprisonment or
assault and battery, inflicted upon them by the special police.5 This Comment will
examine current Ohio law concerning the various categories of special police and will
make recommendations for changes to eliminate these problems.
II. PEACE OFFICERS' AuTHOmTY AND TRAINING
A. Peace Officers
The primary law enforcement officer in the State of Ohio is the peace officer.
Unlike the various categories of special police,6 the peace officer's role and training
are clearly defined by statute. A peace officer is defined as:
A deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, member of the organized police department of
a municipal corporation, or township constable, who is commissioned and employed as a
peace officer by a political subdivision of this state, and whose primary duties are to preserve
the peace, to protect life and property, and to enforce the laws of Ohio, ordinances of a
1. See generally Comment, Reality and Illusion: Defining Private Security Law in Ohio, 13 U. TOL. L. Rsv. 377
(1982).
2. For purposes of this Comment, the term "special police" will be used when referring collectively to all of these
various categories.
3. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Part IV, infra.
6. See infra Parts III and IV.
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municipal corporation, or regulations of a board of county commissioners or board of
township trustees, or any such laws, ordinances, or regulations ....
A peace officer is authorized to arrest any person whom the officer observes
committing an offense, whether it is a misdemeanor or a felony,s or any person the
officer has reasonable cause to believe has committed an offense of violence, the
offense of domestic violence, a theft offense, or a felony drug abuse offense. 9 A
peace officer is further authorized to pursue, arrest, and detain persons outside the
limits of the officer's jurisdiction if the pursuit takes place within a reasonable time
after the offense is committed, begins within the officer's jurisdiction, and if the
offense is a felony, a first or second degree misdemeanor, or a traffic offense for
which points are chargeable.' 0
B. The Ohio Peace Officer Training Council
No person may receive a permanent commission as a peace officer without
successfully completing an approved basic peace officer training program and
obtaining a certificate to that effect." A holder of a temporary commission must
complete an approved program within one year after receiving the commission or else
forfeit it. 12 The Ohio Peace Officer Training Council is charged with establishing
training courses and schools for peace officers.
The Ohio Peace Officer Training Council is a nine-member board within the
Attorney General's Office 3 with the authority to recommend rules to the Attorney
General concerning the training of peace officers. 14 The recommendations may
encompass minimum courses of study, minimum basic training for probationary
peace officers, and advanced training programs for peace officers.' 5 Persons
satisfactorily completing the basic training course established by the Council are
certified by the Council's executive director.' 6
7. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.71(A)(1) (Page 1984).
8. Id. § 2935.03(A).
9. Id. § 2935.03(n).
10. Id. § 2935.03(D).
11. Id. § 109.77(A).
12. Onio ADmeN. CODE § 109:2-1-11(A) (1985).
13. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 109.71 (Page 1984). The members of the Council are appointed by the governor
according to the statutory scheme:
[O]ne member representing the public; two members who are incumbent sheriffs; two members who are
incumbent chiefs of police; one member from the bureau of criminal identification and investigation; one
member from the state highway patrol; one member who is the special agent in charge of a field office of the
federal bureau of investigation in this state; and one member from the state department of education, trade and
industrial education services, law enforcement training.
Id.
14. Id. § 109.73(A).
15. Id. The Attorney General may then adopt the Council's proposals in whole or in part. Id. § 109.74.
16. Id. § 109.75.
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C. Basic Peace Officer Training Program
The basic peace officer training program currently provides for a 280-hour
course of study. 17 Council rules set forth nine subjects to be covered in the training
program and suggest the number of study hours to be spent on each subject.18 The
rules enumerate suggested topics for each subject but give latitude to instructors to
develop the scope of each subject.' 9
The basic training program instructs the prospective peace officers in all aspects
of police work. Course topics include criminal law (including laws of arrest, criminal
procedure, and mechanics of arrest), criminal evidence (including rules of evidence
and search and seizure), criminal investigation (including surveillance, interviews,
and confidential informants), patrol techniques (including domestic disputes, gam-
bling and vice, narcotics, and alcohol abuse), and police skills (including firearm
training, first aid, and human relations). 20
Law enforcement officers thus receive training in a wide range of law
enforcement topics before receiving permanent commissions as peace officers. This
training is designed to ensure that peace officers understand both the scope and the
legal limitations of their powers.
Only law enforcement officers defined by statute as "peace officers," 21 are
required to take the training program. Most special police are not;22 instead, the Ohio
Police Officer Training Council offers a voluntary training program for special
police.23 However, since the scope of authority for special police has not been clearly
delineated by the legislature or the courts, special police often perform the same acts
as duly commissioned peace officers. 24 Thus, special police can engage in law
enforcement activities without the benefit of the extensive training that peace officers
receive before obtaining their permanent commissions. This lack of training increases
the potential for special police unwittingly to exceed the nebulous parameters of their
authority.
HI. STATUTORY AUTHoRrrY FOR SPECIAL POLICE
In addition to the category of peace officers, several categories of special police
have developed in Ohio. Special police may be appointed either by political
subdivisions or private employers.
A. Special Deputy Sheriffs
The authority for commissioning special deputy sheriffs is clouded at best.
County sheriffs have statutory authority to "appoint, in writing, one or more




21. Omo REv. CODE AN-4. § 109.71(A)(1) (Page 1984); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Parts III and IV.
23. OHio REv. CODE A-n4. § 109.78(A) (Page 1984); see infra Part lI.
24. See infra Part IV.
19861
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
deputies.'"'2 This simple language apparently provides the basis for sheriffs'
departments in the state to appoint both regular and special deputies. The statute does
not define regular or special deputies, so the distinction between the two is vague. As
a general matter, a regular deputy appears to be an officer who is employed on a
full-time basis within the sheriff's department under the direct supervision and
control of the sheriff. A special deputy either serves outside the sheriff's department
under the direction and supervision of another, such as a merchant, or serves the
sheriff's department from time to time as needed. 26 Some courts have ruled that there
is no statutory authority for commissioning special deputy sheriffs. 27
The detailed training requirements of the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council
apply to deputy sheriffs,28 but neither the statute providing for the appointment of
deputies29 nor the statute defining "peace officer" 30 distinguishes between regular
and special deputies. To the extent special deputies perform the duties of regular
deputies, special deputies should receive the basic peace officer training. However,
the statute authorizing a voluntary training program for special police provides that
the completion of this program satisfies the educational requirements for special
deputies. 3' The dearth of statutory authority for the appointment of special deputies
makes the legislative intent of this provision impossible to ascertain.
The sheriff is statutorily responsible for the official misconduct of his deputies,
but the statute does not distinguish regular from special deputies in imposing this
liability. 32 The scope of special deputies' authority often is limited by their
commissions to particular locations. For example, when special deputies are
employed as store security guards their commissions are limited to the store's
premises. At least one court has held that, under these circumstances, the acts of
special deputies are the acts not of the sheriff's department but of the private
employer. 33
B. Private Police
A private police officer is employed in the private sector rather than by the
licensing municipality.3 4 City directors of public safety are authorized by statute to
commission private police officers.35
25. Ofto Ray. CODE ANN. § 311.04 (Page 1979).
26. State ex rel. Geyer v. Griffin, 80 Ohio App. 447, 448, 76 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1946).
27. Id. at 457, 76 N.E.2d at 299; State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 174, 337 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1975).
See infra notes 87-94 and 109-20 and accompanying text.
28. Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 109.71(A)(1) (Page 1984); see supra notes 7, 17-20 and accompanying text.
29. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 311.04 (Page 1979).
30. Id. § 109.71(A) (Page 1984).
31. Id. § 109.78(A); see infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text for further discussion of this training course. But
see Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No. 83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P., March 5, 1985), infra notes 121-29
and accompanying text, in which the trial court ruled that a special deputy forfeited her commission by reason of her
failure to complete the basic peace officer training program within one year of her appointment; Op. Att'y Gen. No.
67-123 (1967) and No. 77-027 (1977), in which the Attorney General stated that to the extent special deputies are
performing the duties of regular deputies, they must receive the same training as regular deputies.
32. Onto Ray. CoDE ANN. § 311.05 (Page Supp. 1984).
33. State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975).
34. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-179 (1966).
35. OHio Ray. CODE ANN. § 737.05 (Page 1976).
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Private police officers have the same powers as peace officers employed by the
licensing municipality. 36 Further, the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council program37
applies to private police. If the basic training program has not been completed within
one year from the date of appointment, the commission is forfeited. 38 The private
police officer, unlike the special deputy sheriff, receives extensive education
provided by the basic peace officer training program and is better prepared to exercise
the powers and duties of a regular peace officer.
C. Security Guards
No statutory provisions exist to provide licensing requirements or to delineate
the powers of persons privately employed as security guards or in related capacities.
The Ohio Peace Officer Training Council sponsors a training program covering the
duties and powers of private police, which is available on a voluntary basis to all
persons privately employed. 39
In the absence of express statutory authority, private citizens may not detain or
arrest persons they observe committing a misdemeanor. 40 The rationale is apparently
that the benefit of detaining misdemeanants is substantially outweighed by the
potential for harm to both the public and the parties involved in the detention.
Therefore, private security guards without peace officers' commissions have no
general power to detain someone committing a misdemeanor on their employer's
premises.
A statutory exception to this common law rule authorizes merchants and their
employees to detain suspected shoplifters:41
(A) A merchant, or his employee or agent, who has probable cause to believe that items
offered for sale by a mercantile establishment have been unlawfully taken by a person,
may, for the purpose set forth in division (C) of this section, detain the person in a
reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time within the mercantile establishment
or its immediate vicinity ....
(C) ... [A] merchant or his employer or agent pursuant to division (A) of this section may
detain another person for any of the following purposes:
(1) To recover the property that is the subject of the unlawful taking, criminal mischief,
or theft;
(2) To cause an arrest to be made by a peace officer;
(3) To obtain a warrant of arrest ....-
The power given to merchants and their security guards and other employees to
conduct law enforcement activities is very limited. The statute does not provide
36. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-179 (1966).
37. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
38. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-179 (1966).
39. O o Rsv. CODE ANN. § 109.78(A) (Page 1984); see infra Part II (D).
40. Fitscher v. Rollman & Sons Co., 31 Ohio App. 340, 167 N.E. 469 (1929).
41. Ouio Rxv. CODE Ar. § 2935.041 (Page 1982).
42. Id. A peace officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has been shoplifting may arrest that person
without a warrant. Id. § 2935.041(E).
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blanket authority for any person to detain a suspected thief, nor is it blanket authority
for merchants or their employees to detain persons for any and all crimes committed
within the store. Shoplifting is the only crime for which this power of detention is
granted.43
D. Private Basic Course Training Program
The Ohio Peace Officer Training Council44 has established a voluntary training
program45 for those special police not required to take the basic training program for
peace officers. 46 The voluntary program covers the duties and jurisdiction of persons
privately employed in a police capacity.47
The current training program provides a 118-hour course of study.48 As in the
basic peace officer training course,49 Council rules set forth the subjects to be covered
and the number of hours to be devoted to each. 50 While instructors can use discretion
in developing their subjects, each subject in the basic curriculum must be covered in
its entirety.5 1
Some of the topics, such as shoplifting and patrol of private property, are
designed specifically for the limited duties and jurisdiction of special police. 52 Other
topics, such as the laws of arrest, criminal law, and rules of evidence, parallel the
basic training course for peace officers but are covered in much less detail.5 3
IV. CASE LAW AUTHoRrrY FOR SPECIAL POLICE
A. Peace Officers Acting as Security Personnel
Peace officers often act as private security personnel during their off-duty hours.
The scope of their authority while acting in this private capacity and the responsibility
of the licensing municipality for their acts when performing security duties are
somewhat ambiguous.
In State v. Glover,54 the defendant was arrested and convicted for shoplifting
and resisting arrest by an off-duty Columbus police officer privately employed as a
security guard for a grocery store. 55 The defendant contended on appeal that he could
not be guilty of resisting arrest because the officer was acting solely for the benefit
of his private employer.56 The Franklin County Court of Appeals upheld the
43. State v. Griffin, 54 Ohio Misc. 52, 376 N.E.2d 1364 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1977).
44. See supra Part If (B).
45. Orlo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.78(A) (Page 1984); Onzo ADMIN. CODE § 109:2-3 (1985).
46. See supra Part 11 (C).
47. Oflo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.78(A) (Page 1984).
48. Onto A nuN. CODE § 109:2-3-11 (1985).
49. See supra Part 11 (C).
50. Oino Amii. CODE § 109:2-3-11 (1985).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. For example, 44 hours are devoted to criminal law in the basic peace officer training course, while private
security personnel are given only 4 hours of instruction on criminal law. Id. §§ 109:2-1-16, 109:2-3-11.
54. 52 Ohio App. 2d 35, 367 N.E.2d 1202 (1976).
55. Id. at 38, 367 N.E.2d at 1204.
56. Id. at 35-36, 367 N.E.2d at 1203.
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conviction, holding that duly commissioned police officers have a continuing
obligation to serve the public notwithstanding private employment as security
guards. The arrest of the defendant was therefore lawful. 57
In State v. Fields,58 the court held that a township constable exceeded his
statutory powers while acting as the agent of a private entity. 59 Township constables
are not "peace officers" statutorily permitted to conduct warrantless arrests of
persons based upon reasonable cause; the constable must witness the offense. 60 The
constable was assigned to security duty at a shopping mall pursuant to a contract
between the township trustees and mall management, and the township, not mall
management, paid him and directed his activities. 61 He had arrested the shoplifting
suspect without observing the alleged offense. The arrest was therefore an improper
exercise of his duties as township constable. 62 Although merchants and their
employees may detain suspected shoplifters for probable cause, the court held that the
township constable was acting within his official duties and could not be acting
simultaneously as a merchant's agent.63
In addition, two courts of appeal have held that a deputy sheriff is acting outside
the scope of his official duties while performing security activities for a private
entity. 64 The private employer was therefore liable for wrongful acts committed by
the deputies in the course of their private employment. 65
Of these cases, only Glover allows the officer to act simultaneously as the agent
of both the state and the merchant. Glover can be distinguished from the deputy cases
in that the deputies appear to be special deputies who had not received the training
mandated for peace officers that the police officer in Glover had received. 66 The
result in Fields was based on the provision of section 2935.03, which prohibits
township constables from detaining misdemeanants based on probable cause, rather
than on the constable's employment status.
B. Private Police Officers
Private police officers are publicly commissioned but privately employed. 67
Although not employed by the licensing municipality, they have been held to have the
same powers of arrest and detention as peace officers. 68 The employer of the private
57. Id. at 38, 367 N.E.2d at 1204.
58. 62 Ohio Misc. 14, 405 N.E.2d 740 (Belmont County Ct. 1979).
59. Id. at 18, 405 N.E.2d at 742.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 15, 405 N.E.2d at 741.
62. Id. at 18, 405 N.E.2d at 742.
63. Id. This puts the township constable, a "peace officer" under section 109.71, in the rather anomalous position
of having less power than a merchant and its employees.
64. Garman v. O'Neill, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 650 (Ct. App. 1939); Duff v. Corn, 84 Ohio App. 403, 87 N.E.2d 731
(1947).
65. In these cases, the courts characterized the deputies as regular deputies. However, the courts used descriptions
that indicate they were in all likelihood "special deputies" as that term is now used. A more detailed discussion of these
two cases appears in Part IV (C). See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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police officer, however, may be liable for the acts of the officer in certain
circumstances.
In New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Fieback,69 the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a railroad police officer was a "public officer" even though privately
employed. 70 The plaintiff, Fieback, waiting to meet one of the defendant's employees
at the defendant's railroad yard, aroused the suspicion of a railroad employee71 who
was commissioned as a railroad police officer.72 A scuffle ensued, and the plaintiff
sustained various injuries for which he sought recovery from the railroad. 73 Railroad
police officers are given all the powers of municipal police officers and are authorized
to exercise them in performing their duties on behalf of the railroad, and their acts are
presumed to be within their official duties. 74 When a railroad officer commits an act
outside the public duty of a municipal police officer, the railroad will be liable for the
wrongful act if it authorized or ratified such conduct. 75 The railroad was not liable for
Fieback's injuries because he failed to demonstrate that the officer was acting outside
the scope of his official duties.76
The Fieback reasoning was followed in Neopolitan v. United States Steel
Corp.77 The plaintiffs were detained by two private policemen employed as security
guards by U.S. Steel. The plaintiffs' truck broke down on a road leading to the
defendant's property, and the plaintiffs' apparent loitering near the plant aroused the
suspicions of the officers who detained but did not arrest them. The officers released
the two men after ascertaining that no property had been stolen.78 The two officers,
duly commissioned private police, derived their power from the state and therefore
were acting within the scope of their official duties in detaining the plaintiffs. 79
City of Cleveland v. KufrinO involved a warrantless arrest effected by a private
police officer. The defendant, Kufrin, reached through an open car window and
removed a signal flasher from the dashboard. The officer observed the act and
apprehended him. 81 Although private police are not among those persons enumerated
by statute82 as possessing the power to effect warranfless arrests, the city council is
authorized to prescribe rules for the conduct of these officers. 83 The Cleveland city
council authorized private police to arrest any person committing a misdemeanor in
69. 87 Ohio St. 254, 100 N.E. 889 (1912).
70. Id. at 264, 100 N.E. at 891. The court used the term "public officer" to signify that the railroad police officer
derived his power from the state, rather than from his private employer, under provisions of the Ohio Revised Statutes
then in force. Railroad police are considered peace officers under a current statute, Qo R-v. CoDE ANN. § I09.71(A)(2)
(Page 1984).
71. New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Fieback, 87 Ohio St. 254, 255, 100 N.E. 889 (1912).
72. Id. at 264, 100 N.E. at 890.
73. Id. at 255-56, 100 N.E. at 889.
74. Id. at 264, 100 N.E. at 891.
75. Id. at 265, 100 N.E. at 891.
76. Id. at 266, 100 N.E. at 891.
77. 149 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
78. Id. at 590-91.
79. Id. at 593-94. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
80. 3 Ohio Misc. 2d 18, 446 N.E.2d 230 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1982).
81. Id. at 19, 446 N.E.2d at 231.
82. Owo REv. CooE Ar. § 2935.03 (Page 1982).
83. Id. at § 737.051 (Page 1976).
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the officer's presence. 84 Therefore, the warrantless arrest of Kufrin was a proper
exercise of power by a private police officer.85
C. Special Deputy Sheriffs
As previously noted, there is no statutory authority for commissioning special
deputy sheriffs. 86 However, common law has been held to provide for such deputies.
As the court stated in State ex rel. Geyer v. Griffin:87
There is no statutory restriction upon the right of a county sheriff to appoint special and
general deputies, except that the appointments must be approved by the common pleas judge
of the county of which the sheriff is an officer, and, therefore, the common law prevails
authorizing the sheriff to make such appointments. 88
The court in Geyer identified two types of special deputy sheriffs. The first type
includes those deputies appointed at the request of various business enterprises "for
the sole purpose of keeping peace and protecting the properties and enterprises of
such industrial, manufacturing and other establishments . . . such deputy sheriffs to
be paid by the. . . establishments and to receive no compensation from the county by
the sheriff on which they were so appointed." 89 The second category includes special
deputies not regularly employed by the sheriff's office but subject to assignment by
the sheriff as the need arises. 9° The relator, Geyer, was a special deputy of the second
type. 91 Thereafter, he was employed as a full-time deputy sheriff.92 However, the
auditor refused to pay Geyer for services performed, resulting in a mandamus action
to compel payments. 93 The court ordered payment, holding that the sheriff is granted
the discretion to employ deputies, assign duties, and fix compensation for the
deputies so employed. 94
Garman v. O'Neill95 involved a deputy sheriff who was employed not by the
county but as a security guard for an automobile dealership. Although the court
characterized O'Neill as a regular deputy, he was commissioned to act as a private
security officer for local businesses, indicating that he was a special deputy sheriff of
the first type defined in Geyer.96 While the officer was patrolling the dealer's
showroom, his gun, which he carried by virtue of his deputy's commission, fell from
its holster and discharged, wounding a salesman, who sued the sheriff for the
resulting injuries. 97 The court found that the officer was not acting in his official
84. City of Cleveland v. Kufrin, 3 Ohio Misc. 2d 18, 20, 446 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1982).
85. Id. at 21, 446 N.E.2d at 233.
86. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
87. 80 Ohio App. 447, 76 N.E.2d 294 (1946).
88. Id. at 447, 76 N.E.2d at 295.
89. Id. at 448, 76 N.E.2d at 296.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 449, 76 N.E.2d at 296.
92. Id. at 450, 76 N.E.2d at 297.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 457, 76 N.E.2d at 300.
95. 31 Ohio L. Abs. 650 (Ct. App. 1939).
96. See supra text accompanying note 89.
97. Garman v. O'Neill, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 650, 650 (Ct. App. 1939).
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capacity as a deputy sheriff. The only connection between the injury and his deputy
status was that the commission authorized him to carry a gun.98 Therefore, the sheriff
was not liable for the deputy's negligence. 99
Duff v. Corn1 00 was a wrongful death action against the owner of a bar
employing a deputy sheriff in a security capacity. The deceased was ejected from the
defendant's establishment by a deputy Mays' 0' who shot the deceased in the back
after the deceased had left the bar and was walking toward the street.102 Mays was not
a deputy sheriff when hired by the defendant. The defendant caused him to be
appointed as a deputy shortly after he was hired. 103 The defendant contended that he
was not liable because Mays was acting in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff at
the time of the shooting. 104 The court of appeals held that the employer, not the state,
is liable for the negligent acts of such officers committed while performing private
duties. s05 The court noted that excusing the employer from liability for these acts
would allow the "grossest acts of infamy and outrage"1 06 to be committed by such
officers with virtually no legal recourse available to their victims:
The state would not be liable for such acts, and if the employer-that is, the master, who
makes the officer his representative for his private purposes-is not, because the wrongdoer
is a police officer, such officer may perform the work he is employed to do in the most
grossly careless, wanton, and wilful manner, fraught with great peril to others, and the
injured party must look to the wrongdoer, usually of no pecuniary responsibility, and not the
employer, who employed the wrongdoer to do the very acts complained of, but not in a
wanton, wilful, and negligent manner, a mode fraught with peril to others.'- 7
Therefore, the employer, not the sheriff, was liable for the wrongful act of shooting
the decedent.' 08
In State v. McDaniel,0 9 the Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that a
special deputy sheriff was not performing public duties while acting as a full-time
private security guard. 110 The defendants in six consolidated cases had been arrested
and charged with shoplifting in a Lazarus department store."' The defendants were
surreptitiously observed by store security guards while in a store's fitting rooms. The
guards observed the defendants from a vacant fitting room either by kneeling on the
floor to watch the suspect's actions in the fitting room mirror or by climbing on
shelves and removing a ceiling tile to peer down into adjacent fitting rooms. 1 2 The
98. Id. at 651.
99. Id.
100. 84 Ohio App. 403, 87 N.E.2d 731 (1947).
101. Id. at 404, 87 N.E.2d at 733.
102. Id. at 408, 87 N.E.2d at 743.
103. Id. at 406, 87 N.E.2d at 734. Although not characterized as such, Mays appears to have been a special deputy
of the first type described in Geyer. See supra text accompanying note 89.
104. Duff v. Corn, 84 Ohio App. 403, 405, 87 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1947).
105. Id. at 409, 87 N.E.2d at 735.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 410, 87 N.E.2d at 735.
108. Id. at 412, 87 N.E.2d at 739.
109. 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975).
110. Id. at 174, 337 N.E.2d at 180.
Ill. Id. at 164, 337 N.E.2d at 175.
112. Id. at 165-66. 337 N.E.2d at 176.
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trial court ruled that the evidence obtained by this observation was inadmissible
because it constituted "an invasion of the privacy of the defendants and ... an
unreasonable search in violation of constitutional prohibitions."" 3
The court agreed that these actions violated the defendants' right of privacy," 4
but held that the evidence was not subject to the exclusionary rule of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 5 The exclusionary rule applies only
to illegal searches performed by the government and its officers, and evidence seized
by private individuals without any participation by a government official is
admissible in a criminal proceeding.' 6 The fact that a large percentage of the store's
security staff held commissions as special deputy sheriffs did not transform such
searches into state action.'' 7 As the court observed:
Only Lazarus controls the conduct and activities of its security employees .... They do not
perform their duties for the benefit of the public but, rather, for the benefit of Lazarus. Thus,
we conclude that the activities and conduct of the security employees herein involved did not
constitute state action within the contemplation of constitutional prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 8
The court rejected the suggestion that a special deputy is on official duty while
employed full-time as a store security guard. The sheriff does not maintain any
control over the conduct of the deputy; therefore, the deputy's activities do not
constitute state action." 9 The special deputies were acting only on behalf of their
employer, and their activities were designed to "detect and prevent thievery," not to
perform any public law enforcement function.120
Most recently, the issue of a special deputy's authority was presented in Bennett
v. F. & R. Lazarus.12' The plaintiff was arrested by three of defendant Lazarus'
security personnel who allegedly believed plaintiff to be a convicted shoplifter
previously ordered out of all Lazarus stores.' 22 Plaintiff contended that her detention
and arrest by the individual defendants for criminal trespassing 23 were unlawful
inasmuch as store security guards have the statutory power to detain only those
persons suspected of shoplifting. 24 Defendants maintained that the special deputy
commission possessed by one of the three guards empowered her to effect arrests for
any and all criminal offenses occurring on defendant Lazarus' premises. 25 The
113. Id. at 166, 337 N.E.2d at 176.
114. Id. at 170, 337 N.E.2d at 178.
115. Id. at 176, 337 N.E.2d at 181.
116. Id. at 171, 337 N.E.2d at 177-78, citing People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1968).
117. State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 174-75, 337 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1975).
118. Id. at 175, 337 N.E.2d at 180-81.
119. Id. at 174-75, 337 N.E.2d at 180.
120. Id. at 175, 337 N.E.2d at 180.
121. Case No. 83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P., March 5, 1985).
122. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 1-2, Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No. 83CV-02-1245 (Franklin
County C.P., March 5, 1985).
123. Omo Rsv. CODe AsN. § 2911.21 (Page 1982).
124. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 5, Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No. 83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P.,
March 5, 1985).
125. See Defendants' Arbitration Brief at 8-10, Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No. 83CV-02-1245 (Franklin
County C.P., March 5, 1985).
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special deputy received her commission, limited on its face to Lazarus, on July 21,
1978, and completed the private basic training course program126 in March 1979.127
The trial court ruled that the special deputy forfeited her commission by reason of her
failure to complete the basic peace officer training program mandated by Ohio
Revised Code section 109.71 for deputy sheriffs. 128 The jury returned a verdict in
favor of plaintiff, assessing punitive as well as compensatory damages against
defendant Lazarus. 129
D. Private Security Guards
The final type of special police is private security guards who are not
commissioned by any type of governmental unit. The power of detention granted to
such persons is limited to suspected shoplifters. 130
In State v. Bolan,131 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a store security guard's
limited power of detention does not make the guard a law enforcement officer.
Therefore, the questioning of a suspected shoplifter by security personnel does not
require Miranda warnings. 32 The defendant was observed taking a pair of gloves by
a security guard. The guard detained the defendant and gave him some but not all of
the Miranda warnings. 133 The defendant contended that his confession to the security
guard was inadmissible because the Miranda warnings were not fully given.134 The
court rejected this contention, stating:
[W]here, pursuant to R.C. § 2935.041, an employee of a merchant has detained a person
whom he has probable cause to believe has unlawfully taken items for sale by the mercantile
establishment, an admission or confession made during such detention is not rendered
inadmissible by the failure of such employee to fully explain to such detained person those
constitutional rights set forth in Miranda.'3'
Similarly, the court in State v. Edwards'36 rejected the notion that a store
security guard becomes a law enforcement officer by virtue of his statutory power to
detain suspected shoplifters.137 "The statutory right of a civilian to detain does not
126. See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
127. Transcript at 128, 132; Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 3 and 4, Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No.
83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P., March 5, 1985).
128. Transcript at 709, Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No. 83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P., March 5,
1985).
129. Id. at 717. The jury awarded plaintiff $20,000.00 for compensatory damages and $200,000.00 for punitive
damages. Id. The trial court granted defendant Lazarus' motion for a new trial on the ground that the amount of the verdict
was against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, the trial court expressly declined to reverse the legal rulings
made at trial concerning the special deputy issue. Decision and Entry at 2, Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No.
83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P., October 3, 1985). The case was settled by the parties during appeal.
130. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
131. 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971).
132. Id. at 18, 271 N.E.2d at 840-41. This, however, is a developing area of the law. For example, the Ohio
Supreme Court held recently that Miranda warnings are required prior to any custodial interrogation, regardless of
whether the offense alleged is a felony or a misdemeanor. State v. Buchholz, 11 Ohio St. 3d 24,462 N.E.2d 1222 (1934).
133. State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 17,271 N.E.2d 839, 840-41 (1971). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1965).
134. State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 17, 271 N.E.2d 839, 841 (1971).
135. Id. at 20, 271 N.E.2d at 843.
136. 50 Ohio App. 2d 63, 361 N.E.2d 1083 (1976).
137. Id. at 64, 361 N.E.2d at 1085.
[Vol. 47:
SPECIAL POLICE: A BENEFIT OR A THREAT?
make a police or other public officer out of the merchant or his employee while in the
performance of acts in the retail establishment."'138 The defendant contended that
store security personnel had committed an unlawful search by removing stolen
articles from a shopping bag into which the guards had observed the defendant
placing the articles. The court held that the removal was not a search in the
constitutional sense but was merely a lawful effort by a merchant to repossess stolen
goods.139 Moreover, assuming this action was a search, it would not have been
unconstitutional. Citing Bolan'4o and McDaniel,14 1 the court held that store employ-
ees acting within the scope of their employment are not law enforcement officers and,
therefore, the exclusionary rule does not apply.' 42
Store security personnel exceed their authority by detaining persons suspected of
misdemeanors other than shoplifting. In State v. Griffin, 143 the defendant successfully
challenged the legality of his arrest by store security guards. The defendant was
detained not for shoplifting but for obstructing justice-the guards alleged that the
defendant interfered with the detention of another person who was suspected of
shoplifting. 44 In dismissing the charge, the court stated:
Criminal statutes must be strictly construed and a reading of R.C. 2935.041 authorizes a
store security employee to detain only such persons as may be believed to have unlawfully
taken merchandise. This is not blanket authority for detention of a person committing any
misdemeanor in a department store, it must be a theft.' 45
The court stated that the security guards were acting solely within the scope of their
employment; although one of the guards held a "special police officer" commission,
he was acting on behalf of his private employer, not the state.146
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Further abuses of the private security system '41 can be prevented by legislative
attention to the area. While it is necessary for merchants and other businesses to
employ private security personnel to prevent thievery and protect their property, the
scope of authority for such personnel should be defined by legislation. The current
statutory scheme is incomplete at best. Noncommissioned security personnel are
authorized to detain only suspected shoplifters, but some of these noncommissioned
guards exceed this authority, perhaps at the direction of their employer.' 48 Private
police officers are not statutorily authorized to exercise the powers of a peace officer
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971).
141. State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975).
142. State v. Edwards, 50 Ohio App. 2d 63, 65, 361 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (1976).
143. 54 Ohio Misc. 52, 376 N.E.2d 1364 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1977).
144. Id. at 53-54, 376 N.E.2d at 1366.
145. Id. at 54, 376 N.E.2d at 1366 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 53, 376 N.E.2d at 1365. The court did not describe the type of commission held by the security guard,
except to characterize it as "a special police" commission. Id.
147. See supra Part IV for examples of possible abuses (unlawful arrests, invasions of privacy, and shooting
resulting in death).
148. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 54 Ohio Misc. 52, 376 N.E.2d 1364 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1977).
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but may be granted such power pursuant to municipal ordinance in the political
subdivision in which they are commissioned.1 49 Although no statutory authority
exists for the commissioning of special deputies, sheriffs continue to issue these
commissions.15 0
The case law attempts to define the authority based upon the type of commission
involved. However, even within these categories, disagreement may exist among
courts as to the scope of authority that may be exercised lawfully.'s1 With little
statutory guidance, the approach of the courts seems to be result-oriented. If tortious
conduct or a constitutional rights violation is alleged, the courts attempt to find that
the special police officer's actions were outside the scope of public duty. 5 2 In
criminal cases the courts seem to allow special police greater latitude in effecting
arrests. 153
The preferable approach mandates that special police who are employed as
private security personnel cannot act simultaneously as both public and private
officials. If security personnel, by virtue of possessing commissions such as the
special deputy commission, are given full power of arrest and detention, merchants
could create their own private police forces simply by obtaining commissions for
some or all of their security personnel. Public policy militates against a private police
force subject only to the control and direction of the merchant employing it. A peace
officer is charged with the duties "to preserve the peace, to protect life and property,
and to enforce the laws of Ohio .... ,,154 Private security personnel should not, by
virtue of a special police commission, be authorized to exercise peace officer powers
for the private benefit of their employer, rather than for the public benefit which
peace officers must strive to protect.
Further, private security personnel generally are not subject to the basic peace
officer training course. 155 Private security personnel should not possess the same
149. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Kufrin, 3 Ohio Misc. 2d 18, 446 N.E.2d 230 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1982).
150. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975); Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case
No. 83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P., March 5, 1985).
151. See supra Part IV for a discussion of the case law concerning each category of special police.
152. State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15,271 N.E.2d 839 (1971) (Miranda warnings not required before interrogation
of shoplifting suspect by security guard because no state action), see supra note 131; State v. McDaniel, 44 Ohio App.
2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975) (search and seizure not unconstitutional because not state action), see supra note 109;
Duffv. Corn, 84 Ohio App. 403, 87 N.E.2d 731 (1947) (wrongful death caused by deputy attributed to private employer),
see supra note 100; Garman v. O'Neill, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 650 (Ct. App. 1939) (negligence of deputy attributed to private
employer), see supra note 95; but see New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Fieback, 87 Ohio St. 2d 254, 100 N.E. 889 (1912)
(no assault because railroad officer within scope of official duty), see supra note 69; Neapolitan v. United States Steel
Corp., 149 N.E.2d 589, (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (no false imprisonment because private police officers within scope of
official duties), see supra note 77.
153. State v. Glover, 52 Ohio App. 2d 35, 367 N.E.2d 1202 (1976) (off-duty police officer within official duties
in arresting shoplifting suspect), see supra note 54; City of Cleveland v. Kufrin, 3 Ohio Misc. 2d 18, 446 N.E.2d 230
(Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1982) (private police officer within official duties in conducting warrantless arrest of person
observed committing misdemeanor), see supra note 80; but see, State v. Fields, 62 Ohio Misc. 14, 405 N.E.2d 740 (Ct.
App. 1979) (township constable had no power of arrest since he cannot be simultaneously the agent of both township and
merchant), see supra note 58; State v. Griffin, 54 Ohio Misc. 52, 376 N.E.2d 1364 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1977) (special police
commission confers no authority to arrest while acting in private capacity), see supra note 143.
154. Oalo REv. CODE Aro. § 109.71(A)(1) (Page 1984).
155. See supra Part II.
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powers as peace officers unless they receive training which will adequately prepare
them to exercise such powers.
Perhaps the greatest danger is the absence of clearly defined powers and
limitations of special police. Constitutional issues such as search and seizure and
Miranda warnings have been raised but not finally resolved as to all categories of
special police.' 56 The power of arrest possessed by special police is similarly
clouded. 157 Until the limits of authority of sppcial police are resolved, the public
remains exposed to the risk of being detained, arrested, questioned, and searched
unconstitutionally by special police. Likewise, the public remains vulnerable to torts
committed by officers who believe that they are pursuing their official duties. 158
The various categories of special police should be statutorily eliminated, because
regardless of the title used, all of these persons are performing private security
functions. A mandatory training program should be established and tailored to the
private security role of special police. The program should concern many of the
subjects contained in the basic peace officer training course, 159 and should present
these topics in the context of the limited scope of authority of special police.
To do their job effectively, special police should be given a limited power of
detention, but should not be authorized to make arrests. A power of detention similar
to that granted by the shopkeeper's statute, 160 which allows merchants and their
employees to detain shoplifters so that they can be arrested by a peace officer, if not
limited to shoplifting, would give the special police adequate authority to perform
their jobs. However, this power should be clearly limited by statute and should be
given only to those officers who complete the suggested training.
Although they are not peace officers, special police should be categorized as
public officers to prevent a private employer from creating a police force subject only
to private control. For example, the legislature could categorize private security
personnel seeking commissions as special deputies and could define the enhanced
attendant authority. The sheriff of each county could monitor their activities. While
the interest of the public is often coextensive with that of the private employer, such
as in the prevention of shoplifting, an overzealous special police officer may be
tempted to exceed statutory powers. 16 Control of commissioned special police will
ensure that these officers exercise their authority for the public good, and it will
protect the public from unauthorized detentions, arrests, and tortious conduct
engendered by the current system.
Karen L. Clouse
156. See supra text accompanying notes 109-20, 131-42.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65, 143-46.
158. See, e.g., New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Fieback, 87 Ohio St. 254, 100 N.E.889 (1912) (assault), see supra
note 69; Duff v. Corn, 84 Ohio App. 403, 87 N.E.2d 731 (1947) (wrongful death), see supra note 100; Garman v.
O'Neill, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 650 (Ct. App. 1939) (negligence), see supra note 95; Bennett v. F. & R. Lazarus, Case No.
83CV-02-1245 (Franklin County C.P., March 5, 1985) (false arrest), see supra note 121.
159. See supra Part H (C).
160. Oto REv. Cons AN;. § 2935.041 (Page 1982).
161. For example, a commissioned plant guard may be tempted to search a detainee suspected of petty theft to
recover the items believed stolen.
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